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Introduction
In many countries interactive policy-making is
seen as an important way to improve the quality
of governmental plans as well as to involve
people in the decision-making process, whereby
they can learn to understand problems and to
perceive solutions. Alltogether these processes
have to lead to better accepted policy plans and
improved relationships between governments and
citizens.
Communication professionals, in extension or
more general in the field of information and
education, are more and more connected to this
approach. They can act as facilitators to guide the
process of learning and negotiating or at least get
a role in it.
In agriculture interactive policy-making is linked
to another view on what farmers can do to tune
into the expectations of society at large, away
from the ‘coping position’, whereby farmers try
to deal with measures of the government as
cleverly as they can, towards more pro-active
attitudes.
We will look at this process from the angle of
governmental agencies and from the position of
communication specialists (CS) who work there.
I shall list several of the theoretical
considerations. They originate from very
different perspectives and yet have something in
common, or rather are united. I shall describe
them as the antipodes of where we are directed,
as persistent modes of thinking from the past
from which we have to distantiate ourselves (re-
educate). I shall constantly indicate what should
take place instead. Together these orientations –
there are five of them- characterise the change in
approach to the government-citizen relationship.
We could say it is a ‘paradigm-shift’, a shift in
the global outlook on the subject.
The first orientation concerns the phenomenon of
self-referentiality. By this I mean that an
organisation often has a very own way of
perceiving itself and its environment, without
being conscious of it – like a fish that is unaware
of swimming in water. However, the CS should
be conscious of this. After all, he or she works –
at least so it seems – at the edge of the
organisation, with one eye turned towards the
inside and the other towards the outside. That is a
good way to develop a headache but to prevent
this from happening the CS has several strategies
to choose from. The most usual strategy is to just
wrap oneself up in one’s own work environment,
one’s own organisation. Yet other strategies are
possible. However, this entails that the CS has to
work at the functioning of his or her own
organisation.
The second theoretical orientation deals with a
rather common line of thought, which I shall call
‘instrumental’. Hereby the environment of an
organisation is perceived as a unity that can be
influenced. In this case one’s own organisation is
the mover, the people (or groups) outside are
those moved, at least, that is the intention. In this
way, communication becomes part of social
engineering to adjust the thinking and acting of
others. I want to explain that real change does not
occur in this manner. It is only through
interaction that change takes place.
The third orientation specifically concerns the
vision on communication. Here again we see an
opinion that accords with the dominant practice,
but that can still be questioned. I am referring to
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communication as an activity of the sender,
consisting of formulating messages which then
accomplish something with the receiver. The
transport-metaphor is sometimes used for this.
Something goes from one to the other, possibly
(strongly) deformed, but even so there is
transport. Naturally, this idea fits perfectly well
with the instrumental thinking mentioned above.
However, I want to demonstrate that
communication cannot be interpreted in this way.
In fact, there is nothing at all going from the
sender to the receiver. The term ‘receiver’ is
therefore very unfortunate. The receiver does not
receive but constructs.
Then, in the fourth orientation, we look at the
entity one wants to change. In many models of
influencing, the dominating idea is that of an
individual whose behaviour changes after a
change of attitude. The individual is hereby
understood as an entity with certain dispositions
which when recognised can be altered. This idea
gives stability and is therefore attractive, as it is
indeed so that if the number of people to be
influenced is minimalized (down to a single
individual) the chances of effective change seem
to increase. However, I do not consider this to be
entirely valid. Social change is not simply
enacted in the minds of individuals but initially
and principally between individuals through
conversation. So the main objective is to analyse
what is going on during these talks. We shall
discuss the consequences of this radical change
in outlook (from static individualistic to dynamic
social).
Finally, all of this is connected to a different
opinion about how one, in society,  talks in the
public sphere about public issues, or to put it
differently, with views on democracy (the fifth
orientation). In present day practice the market
approach dominates, whereby a political party
struggles for favour of the voters. However, I
argue for another vision. What matters to us is
not only merely a better registration of the
opinions of individual citizens (elections,
referenda or televoting) but rather the process of
opinion-forming itself, for which, again, dialogue
forms the foundation.
These five theoretical perspectives determine my
vision on the interactive approach. It is not just
an armchair-theory about how the world works or
how it should work, rather what I report forms
the legitimation of an existing and growing
practice and is also inspired by it.
Self-referentiality
Self-referentiality refers to a characteristic of
people and organisations to perceive the
environment (and themselves) from their own
perspective, from their own concept of relevance,
from a completely obvious (to them) idea of what
is important or not. Thus one sees certain things,
while others remain invisible. One does, literally,
not have an eye for it. Important is the fact that it
is taken for granted. On the one hand a person
has his/her own vision of the surroundings but on
the other does not perceive this.
The concept of ‘self-referentiality’ has some
similarity to the psychological concept of
‘selective perception’. Everyone filters the
information from their environment that is in
some way useful. This can be of pragmatic use.
For example, someone who wants to buy a coat
will pay more attention to the coats people are
wearing in his environment. But other
considerations can matter as well. It is regularly
assumed that the urge of self-maintenance plays
a role in selective perception, so no-one wants to
be confronted too much with information that is
contrary to his/her own opinion. In other words,
one tries to avoid tension. This is the point of
departure for the cognitive dissonance theory
(Festinger, 1957). But there are also other
approaches. An alternative explanation is that in
our heads pieces of knowledge are not un-
connected but linked. Together, they for a pattern
or structure. In this structure certain information
easily gets a place, whereas for other information
no such places can be found (Hewstone rt al.,
1988). This structured memory also influences
our perception. We see what we know.
What goes for individuals, goes for organisations.
Organisations can treat their environment
selectively in a way that is obvious, at least for
themselves. They only see certain aspects of this
environment and what they see is then interpreted
in a very specific way. Wilke (1992) makes a
connection between self-referentiality and the
structure of organisations. We could assume that
when an organisation is less flexible with regard
to its structure, it is also less receptive to changes
in its environment. So, whilst external change is
making a continuous appeal for internal change,
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there is simply no room for it. Thus, when one
experiences little potential for change in an
organisation, one will prefer to perceive the
environment as stable and in accordance with
that which is relevant and embedded in the
internal structure. One sees what one is. The
environment is constructed from the internal
identity.
The idea of an active construction clearly
resurfaces in Bekkers’ description of the line of
thought pursued by Weick (Bekkers, 1994,
p.162). Weick points to the fact that organisations
do not have objective and complete information
about issues pertaining to their external environ-
ment. Certain developments are, deliberately, left
out of perspective. Information is selective and
filtered, based on a ‘bias’, which in turn is
determined by specific interests and the positions
and frames of reference of those involved. These
determine the relevance of the information to be
collected and processed. The gathering of infor-
mation implies a selection process at the same
time, in which the environment is constructed
once again. As hungry people smell food and
someone who wants to buy shoes sees shoes
everywhere, so also are organisations directed
towards their surroundings according to their
needs and interests. Weick calls this process
‘enactment’.
When seen in this light, the boundaries of a self-
referential system are not closed but selectively
open. One does learn from the environment, but
according to one’s own norms. One could speak
of ‘blinding insights’. Leeuwis states that it is a
matter of a growing insight and a growing
ignorance, at the same time (Leeuwis, 1993,
p.185). One is simply unaware of what happens
in certain parts of the environment and one is
unconscious of that unawareness. It is precisely
the fact that when it is taken for granted that it is
worrying.
Can it be helped? We have to be pessimistic
about that; what is not perceived, cannot be taken
into account, for it does not exist! It can only
change if the environment gives strong enough
feedback. Commercial organisations have a great
advantage in this respect, because here the
market reacts to a bad adjustment. Many
enterprises have been able to make a fresh start
after their financial returns have declined due to
poor sales. But what happens at a ministry if half
of the new legislation encounters implementation
problems? In the direct sense this does not happen
too often thus upholding the status quo. But
eventually the consequences become apparent.
An impotent ministry, that repeatedly fails to
meet the promises made by parliament, gradually
comes under pressure and loses authority, which
makes it even harder to realise the plans. There is
a threat of losing position. There is a reduction of
responsibilities, one is vulnerable in times of cut-
backs. There is, therefore, a certain amount of
reaction to inadequate functioning but this is
somewhat concealed. The idea that the
government is attached to society by all sorts of
strings and that by this an automatic interaction
and tuning takes place must be considered as
naive. On the contrary the contact is more of a
problematic nature. Generally speaking, the
government is suffering from an ailing image.
The citizen is no longer acquainted with the
governing figures, and there looms a threat of
decreasing polling figures which in turn leads to
a lower legitimacy, etcetera. Something is
certainly wrong and this is becoming increasingly
evident even for the government itself.
A feeling of dependency is essential for breaking
through self-referentiality. Without the other,
one’s own objectives cannot be realised. Without
at least the minimal commitment of the citizen,
for example, no effective legislation is attainable.
Knowing the other in the environment is a con-
dition for one’s own effectivity. This dependency
is, by the way, mutual. Citizens cannot do
without a government. What it is about is that the
government can place the citizen in their own
environment but also the other way around that it
can imagine itself in this environment of citizens.
In this way one can question one’s own identity
and there is room to reflect on one’s own
functioning.
Reflection asks for specific personal qualities,
one of which we call ‘empathy’. I define empathy
as the ability to simulate the affective and
cognitive processes of others. I will elaborate on
this because it says something about the qualities
one needs in an organisation to work more from
the outside world. It concerns three aspects:
1.The motivation to get to know the other, based
on a personal involvement with his or her life.
A governor who takes up a position as the wise
authority will rarely be inclined to go deeply
into the motives of a group of citizens.
Van Woerkum
201
2.The ability to make contacts. It is relatively
easy to empathise with people in one’s own
network. After all, they look suspiciously like
oneself! But authorities should be able to get
along with categories of people different than
those well known. Contact should be made
with them. Empathy is not a mythical kind of
clairvoyance, but is based on experience and
series of interactions, preferably  of a more
personal nature. One does not get to know the
citizen through public meetings only.
3.Insight into human character. Within this old-
fashioned concept I mean the ability to
perceive and interpret differences between
people, in order to make a more balanced
judgement about certain reactions and, more
importantly, without stereotyping.
These three characteristics are, as can be
anticipated, not divided equally in an
organisation. A minister, an elected member of a
local authority or a porter is assumed to be in
possession of more empathy than, for instance, a
bookkeeper. We may expect that a CS is the most
suitable person to raise the issue of the self-
referential character of organisations and to take
corrective measures. Unfortunately this does not
occur. Usually, the CS are so wrapped up in their
own environment that they actually mimic or
copy its culture (superiors, colleagues, internal
sources of knowledge), consequently they fail to
meet up  to expectations. This happens in
particular if a CS works in the mass media sphere
and as a result has no face-to-face contacts with
clients.
A CS usually has a clear mental picture of the
people from his or her direct environment among
which communication themes are discussed.
When at work, day-to-day thinking will be based
on a continuation and development of these
discussions. As a mental image, the public is
often nothing more than a diffuse stereotype,
without any clear potential to steer. Because of a
lack of regular testing, norms for good and bad
communication are developed internally and
confirmed and validated time and again. A ‘good
text’ is often one that is seen as adequate
according to inside norms, without any
consideration for the world of the expected
reader. And finally, the reward system is put up
by the organisation itself, without external
reference. It often occurs that a CS is not
controlled to see if he has indeed checked the
communicative level of the message for the target
group. Extra efforts on this score are neither seen
nor valued enough. In the meantime there is little
the public can do. At most it can ‘reward’ or
‘punish’ by incidentally answering survey
questions of others. This reflects the incapacity of
the average citizen perhaps the clearest. 
The conclusion is clear: CS’s certainly
communicate efficiently, but than usually to their
own public – within their own work environment.
It is for this reason that one can state that
communication aimed at the general public is
only possible in an organisation which, as a
whole, ‘thinks from without to within’.
Instrumental thinking
By instrumental thinking I mean an approach
whereby an actor, with the confident hope that it
is possible, aims to reach a predetermined goal
by means of an assigned set of instruments. This
actor is in our case as a rule the government. The
government itself can think instrumentally, that
is, to think that it can drive society with a clever
set instruments, but is often forced to do so by
the community. Much responsibility is pushed in
its direction under the assumption that in this
manner problems can be disposed of. It is
therefore, for good reason that the government
has been given several means with which
something should be achieved. The government
can apply force with legislation and can establish
all kinds of provisions and services, from
museums to sleeping policeman and from
schools to recycling bins, and can manoeuvre
with money, through subsides or taxation. And,
finally, the government can possibly achieve
something by communication (Van Woerkum
et al., 1999).
Instrumental thinking is a product of
pragmatism, a line of thought which originated at
the end of the ‘Seventies’ as a reaction to the
‘Sixties’. In those years the emphasis was put on
major changes in structure and culture of our
society (another production system, another
consumption culture), now it was about really
achieving something. After all, according to
some the proposed or, necessary, revolution, had
not taken place. Instead of discussion, action was
needed in order to gain control of the advancing
problems, in particular those concerning the
environment or energy resources.
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Precisely because of such issues, there was a
growing awareness that the government had to do
something. Since the Middle Ages the
environment has been an issue of central concern
for governments. According to many citizens
something should be done but they hesitate to
make the first move themselves (the ‘after you
effect’). The government can then impose
compulsory regulations for everyone and thus
divide the burdens more equally as well as
coping with the special task of dealing with
industrial polluters or with agriculture.
Often  a social minority group of activist
citizens, usually well-organised and supported by
the media, provides the necessary political
pressure, leading to authorities developing policy
proposals. In a diffuse yet positively disposed
climate of public opinion, these proposals are
accepted by representative mediums. Science
attains an important legitimising role, regarding
the objectives (what is needed to get the
problems under control?) as well as the means
(what is the most effective scenario?).
In this model the subject appears as an individual
to be influenced. One cannot assume that he
would automatically display the desired
behaviour all by himself, the whole problem
could not have such magnitude if that would be
the case. So, intervention is needed, whereby the
government is the mover, the individual the
moved. For this, the government has a set of
instruments at its disposal, the ‘tools of
government’. The idea behind this, is that many
social problems are not properly solved because
these instruments are insufficiently and
negligently used. With the help of sophisticated
analysis methods the result of government
intervention had to be improved. However, in my
opinion, the ‘effectiveness crisis’ with which the
government struggles, will not be averted by a
more careful input of the means, especially when
there is  chronic acceptance of the problem. This
has several reasons.
An important fact is that by following an
instrumental approach the government has placed
itself some distance away from that same society
it wants to lead. Those who think in terms of
intervention withdraw the initiative from the
other party. A distinction is made between
themselves as responsible actors, competent and
only looking at the general interest, and the rest
of society, who do not take problems seriously
enough, have insufficient understanding and
think only in terms of particular interests. This
attitude possibly enforces the self referential
character of governments, which will be dealt
with in the last paragraphs.
It is true that the other as an object to influence is
looked at seriously, yet from an internally
constructed pattern of thought. The citizen is not
assumed to have interesting opinions on problem
definitions or solutions. It is not surprising that
the citizen reacts to this attitude with annoyance.
The image of the government is given the
impression of arrogance and meddling. Even
worse is that the contents of policies are badly
adjusted to social reality. In an instrumental
approach policies are mostly based on scientific
data, regarding the seriousness of a problem, the
desired interventions, as well as the concrete
measures which should be taken. Scientific
rationality is not an independent entity, but is
rather embedded in the political and
governmental framework. Policy-makers initiate
certain research and make selective use of
existing studies. For example, research on the
consequences of nitrogen run-off from
agricultural systems polluting the human water
supply was taken into account at too late a stage.
Social scientific research often views citizens
from the frame of reference of the influencing
party as well. In this context the term social
technocracy is sometimes used. The contact
between government and citizens takes place
through questionnaires instead of through open
public debates or intensive dialogue. It is ‘sender
directed’. The citizen cannot contribute to the
policies but in an approving, manner simply
undergo them.
What about the communication between
government and citizen in an instrumental
approach? Much has been written about this
(see, among others, Van Woerkum et al., 1999).
Clearly, emphasis lies on communication during
the implementation phase. Or, in other words:
communication can become an important part of
the policy plan, by which a social problem should
be solved, but the policy plan does not have to be
the result of ample communication. The
government knows best what is most needed,
helped by self-directed interactions through
social scientific research, and has at the end of
the policy process: a) a clear vision of what
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should be done, expressed in a policy proposal;
and b) a set of arguments, internally constructed,
by which choices made can be legitimised.
CS’s are put to work according to what is called
the Decide-Announce-Defend model. Firstly, one
decides on the final plan. After that, this plan is
announced and subsequently defended, which is
‘ultimately almost always contra-productive’,
according to Wossink (Wossink, in Van
Meegeren, 1995, p.101). Communication has
therefore an informative function and a task of
coping with acceptance. Besides, communication
can have, just as other instruments, a function to
realise the required behaviour, for instance,
through campaigns.
The problem of a dubious image and a badly
adjusted policy is difficult to solve in the
implementation phase through communication –
however intensive. A desired level of public
support is hardly every formed under an
instrumentally thinking and acting government.
The central problem here is not so much
insufficient public support for what the policy
comes up with, but not enough support for what
matters to citizens in the world of policy-makers.
However, for this the instrumental vision has to
be abandoned.
The alternative for an instrumental vision is an
approach in which the government leaves its role
as regulator and takes up position as a co-actor in
a system of responsible parties, with the special
task of encouraging dialogue between these
parties and, where necessary, of facilitating the
process through the set of instruments at its dis-
posal. In a model like this, regulations assume
the character of formalised results of
negotiations, binding for all the parties involved
to which one has obliged himself (eagerly or
not). Money is generated to support social
initiatives and to induce necessary activities.
Communication moves from the function of
attitude and behavioural change to the function
of process guide. The CS is (in any case co-)res-
ponsible for the planning and implementation of
public debates in negotiations between public
actors. Quite a drastic difference from the former
position. We will have to think about what this
means for the CS.
Communication as transmission
McQuail states that the core of the most
dominant academic movement in communication
studies is based on the idea that communication
is about transmission (McQuail, 1994, p.43). We
recognise this in the communication model of
Shannon and Weaver, who look at the
improvement of the technical efficiency of
communication channels to transfer information.
This model is characterised by a process that has
several stages, starting with a source or sender
which selects a message, in the form of a signal
this is passed on through a channel to a receiver,
after which the receiver sends a message which
informs the source about the impact of the
original message (‘feedback’). By avoiding
disturbances in the process (‘noise’) and of
course by using feedback the effects of
communication can be optimised. This all fits
perfectly with the instrumental approach
discussed above.
In applied communication science, the idea of
transmission is found in many forms. Obviously
one was not so naïve as to think that the
communication effect would occur at the receiver
end automatically. An important reason for this
was because of the receiver himself, who could
filter the message in several ways, by not paying
attention, or by looking at the message in a
different way than was intended by the sender
(selective attention and selective perception) or
by interpreting it differently. The existing
opinions of the receivers were to a great extent
responsible for this ‘disturbed’ reception, and in
order to be able to communicate more effectively
one had to take these opinions into account. The
CS had to know the predispositions of the
receiver in order to correspondingly adjust the
message. If this was done, than there certainly
was a chance that the intended communication
effect would occur. As a result, failed communi-
cation can be blamed on careless preparation of
communication activities and on insufficient
knowledge about the receiver’s predispositions
and on an ill-considered adaptation of the
message to these predispositions.
Earlier I developed a working plan that is
founded on these ideas and that should lead to a
product with ‘guaranteed utility’ (Van Woerkum,
1989, p.30). Through research in the preparation
(explorative receiver-research) or in the phase of
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the second revision (pre-tests) it was possible to
eliminate the most important uncertainties. In
doing so, one had to use available theories on
how people were capable of paying attention to
something, or how understanding or a change of
attitude emerged. This was how a scientifically
justified communicative intervention could be
planned. In the case of the undertaking not being
successful this would become clear from
evaluation research, and this would allow for
improvement as well. At least, that was the idea.
Meanwhile we have become sadder and wiser.
The idea of the communication process as a
regulated system is very attractive, but not
adequate. Let me mention some problems.
In the first place it is not a very good idea to talk
about communication in terms of transmission.
Unlike technical communication, with people
nothing goes from one to the other. So the
received does not receive but creates something,
in their encounter with the environment. As a
result, communication effects are not a reflection
of sent messages, but constructions. When we
read a book we imagine ourselves as the
protagonist. We allow him on grounds of the text
to move about and meet people. Suppose that we
find this book very interesting, then there is a
chance that we react overjoyed if the book is
filmed but when we actually see the film it often
turns out to be a disappointing experience. We
react by saying: ‘the book was better’. But we
could also have said: ‘Our film was better’. What
we do with images and with all kinds of
associations determines to a greater extent the
receiving process.  
With communication it is better to talk about a
double process: what the sender does with the
receiver and vice versa. There are major
differences between the messages that are offered
and their ‘consumption’ºIn addition, the usage is
often different from what the sender intended.
One ‘learns’ something from entertaining
programmes, one ‘enjoys’ a news programme.
So the term ‘receiver’ is also a misplaced one. In
fact, like car producers, we should call back our
ex-students for a proved-necessary mental repair!
Because of the demonstrable risks, we should
therefore replace the receiver-concept with the
concept of user or interpreter. However, the
receiver-concept is generally accepted and the
mentioned alternatives seem unattractive.
Therefore we have to manage with the concept of
‘receivers’, recognizing they are at least very
active ones.
In the second place, it is not only what the sender
produces consciously that counts, the unintended
signals, like non-verbal signals, count as much
(Van Woerkum, 1995, p.75-87). At least, from
the point of view of the user these non-conscious,
unintended signals are as important as the
conscious and intended. They often reflect what
the sender ‘really’ means or feels and we,
therefore, regularly use them as a check on what
is suggested by a message. Clearly, the sender
knows this and tries, as far as possible, to get a
grip on the signals he or she sends, especially on
those signals which are usually seen as authentic,
facial expressions, for example. In turn, the user
if familiar with the possibility of manipulation
and if he or she is looking for genuine authentic
signals, to which the sender, et cetera. It is this
kind of phenomena that often make
communication so problematic and that can
explain misunderstandings and incomprehension,
or why certain contacts blossom (there is a
‘connection’) and others do not. Often in the
latter situation, not enough credibility has
emerged, which is an important basis for good
contact.
Thirdly, the transition model suffers from what
Rogers and Kincaid (1981) call a ‘psychological
bias’. I will elaborate on this in the next
paragraph. Here, I want to state that in the
challenged model an illusion of a ‘tête-à-tête’ is
created: of an isolated event between sender and
receiver, through a medium with a message. In
reality all communication is to a great extent
contextual, a part of a much broader
communication pattern in which the user comes
across the same type of message in all kinds of
confrontations with the mass media – and, what
is more important, with people in their own
environment. On the one hand these
confrontations determine how this one message
is perceived and on the other hand what is then
done with it. A farmer who hears how he pollutes
the environment with his manure, also hears,
even from scientific sources, how much this is
(certainly in part) disputed.
What does all this mean for the CS? For him or
her the old model was often attractive because it
suggests effectiveness. Communication equals
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influence. Those who manage ‘good’
communication would certainly influence as
well. Much ‘good’ communication was equal to
much effect.
Disposing of this idea puts the CS in a difficult
position, one cannot count on anything anymore?
Indeed, communication effects are highly
unpredictable. Yet communication can be very
effective, but, however, can only be approached
in terms of probability; and even then we have to
accept much uncertainty. In any case the
communication should be seen from the
perspective of the whole range of signals a
sender like the government radiates, also the
signals which are not intended as being
communicative. For example, a policy paper on
nature which applies to the agricultural
environment can unintentionally suggest that:
‘you did not do well with the landscape. We are
taking over the responsibility for it. From now on
the government will decide how it is going to
look here’. Not a signal that will lead to warm
feelings of solidarity and to co-operation on the
part of the farmers. There should also be more
thought given to cultural factors that can lead to
certain interpretations, such as the images the
farming community have of nature versus other
images of nature. Finally, one has to have an eye
for the whole communicative context in which a
message appears. What does one hear from
whom? How does one talk about it?
An approach like this is at odds with a practice
that feels strongly about ‘accountability’. If you
first have to demonstrate what you can achieve
with communication, in order to get the money
for it, then you will be inclined to use a
transmission model that suggests at the
achievement and you do not talk easily about the
room for construction for the receiver or about
all these contextual variables. Our approach
conflicts equally with the idea of distribution of
information. In communication sending is just
one of the possibilities. An active receiver can try
to get information (via the telephone, via
Internet) that can be made available by a source.
Perhaps you have to put information at one’s
disposal  more then you have to spread it.
The individual as target
Much government communication targets the
individual. The individual should drive more
carefully, stop smoking, recycle paper. Farmers
must care for their pigs and chickens and must
not spoil the environment with pesticides. Many
social problems, so it is thought, cannot be
solved without people changing their behaviour.
In turn behaviour is determined by attitude, and
communication can lead to a change of attitude.
This then is the motive behind many
communication campaigns.
This way of thinking about influencing the
attitude of the individual is crucial. We must,
therefore, see for ourselves how interesting this
concept is. Potter and Wetherell (1987) placed
some question marks by the scientific
presumptions regarding ‘attitude’. For example,
an attitude assumes a relatively constant and
sustainable inclination to react in the same way
to an object. In reality people often show, even
within one conversation, different ‘attitudes’
depending on the context in which an expression
occurs. For example, I could talk understandingly
about the illegal practices of travellers, from the
context of unfortunate government interventions
which have undermined the economic base of
these people. However, in another context, in
which equal rights and duties of citizens are
discussed, I may often approve of strong
intervention by the police.
Besides, we have the problem that an ‘object’
about which people have an attitude does not
exist in an unequivocal way, like our solar system
in the cosmos. ‘Traveller’ is not an empirical
‘clean’ concept. Whilst talking about travellers
we create an image of them, together with our
evaluative statements. In my milder statements I
consider them as eternal wheeler-dealers, who
always find a way out in hard times, creative
when necessary, without taking too much notice
of the formal regulations we have created for
them. In more spiteful statements I consider them
as opportunistic profiteers, who claim the rights
society offers to them but neglect the duties. The
image then becomes more severe. Even though I
consider them in different ways I am still talking
about the same travellers. The definition of the
object and the evaluation of it go hand in hand.
Should we depart from attitudes, in the practice
of communication, we can be guided by
innumerable models on attitude which offer
frames of reference for communicative
interventions, through which we ultimately could
The Journal of Agricultural Education and Extension, 2000, vol. 6, no. 4
206
move the citizen towards a different type of
(better) behaviour (O’Keefe, 1990). A change of
attitude leads to a change of behaviour, at least,
that is the idea. However, the general tendency in
literature is that the relation between attitude and
behaviour is anything but clear. Wilke states that
‘only in special cases are attitudes good
predictors of behaviour’ (Wilke, 1991, p.455).
Finally, in many attitude models it is
insufficiently recognised how people form an
attitude. In the model of Fishbein and Ajzen the
creators differentiate between the ‘individual’
attitude and the subjective norm, the expectations
from one’s environment combined with the
motivation to meet these expectations. But
attitudes are based on information, which in turn
is definitely derived in part from the social
environment, mixed with the norms of desirable
behaviour. Opinions of individuals are ‘socially
constructed’. They also strongly determine the
identity of their own group. In looking at our
own environment we are not unconnected from
our group members (see Leeuwis, 1993, p.63 and
further).
In view of these problems, I would like to
introduce another approach which possibly offers
interesting perspectives for CS’s. I do not want to
suggest by this that attitude on the whole is
inefficient. However, there are sufficient
arguments to look at changing processes from a
different point of view, that is less individualistic
and also less static.
I think that I have found this approach in the
conversation analysis. This analysis does not
concentrate on individuals but on what happens
between individuals. It is a strongly empirically-
coloured research tradition (conversations can be
directly observed, attitudes sometimes as well –
through observation of behaviour – but here the
interview dominates as the instrument).
Whilst the accent on interaction can be seen as a
reaction to behavioural research, it is as much a
logical consequence of the old diffusion theory,
which departs from informal conversations
between people as the motor of social change.
The influence of ‘external communication’, for
example, messages from the mass media, should
not be overestimated. Roper writes in the
foreword of Katz and Lazersfeld’s classic
‘Personal Influence’: ‘I have come to the
tentative conclusion that ideas often penetrate the
public as a whole slowly and – even more
importantly – frequently by interaction of
neighbour to neighbour without any apparent
influence from the mass media’ (Katz and
Lazersfeld, 1995, p.XV). It is certainly the case
that the newer developments in the diffusion
theory have stressed the formal side of
interactions, which means that they look
especially at who has contacts with whom, what
network exist (Weenig & Midden, 1991). I,
however, do not make this choice. With  research
on conversation I focus on the internal side of
interactions. Since this is a less well-known area
I will discuss it a bit further on.
It is about three questions:
a.In what way do people give a certain subject a
theme?
b.In what way do they label this? From whom is
the subject coming and how do they feel about
it?
c.In which terms do they talk about a subject?
I will discuss these three questions shortly.
a. Thematizing
It is stated above that people cannot be compared
concerning their attitudes towards an ‘object’
since the object itself is interpreted differently all
the time. The primary goal of  conversation
analysis, the way I imagine it, is to study how
people approach a subject. So it is not about
finding out what people do or do not know about
important political issues, and certainly it is not
about whether they have a good understanding of
the ‘official’ version but rather the citizen is
considered to be a subject who simply takes an
active part in conversation. Quoting Crigler and
Jensen I want to state that: ‘we point to the active
role of political subjects in reconstructing and
making sense of political information’ (Crigler
ans Jensen, 1991, p.17).
For example, the drugs problem can be
interpreted as a problem of social order (purses
and car radios being robbed), as a medical
problem, as a psychological problem (escapism),
or as a problem of ethnic minorities. Depending
on the choice for one or more of these versions
the conversation will differ. Of course, this
choice is not made without reason. From the
several available models of conversation people
choose for a selection that enables them to
ventilate certain opinions or to justify certain
behaviour. One who approaches the drugs
problem as a social order problem will quickly
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accuse the government of insufficient police
control. The government fails in the area of
public safety. Those who treat it as a
psychological problem can show compassion and
understanding for the victims (addicts).
b. The vocabulary
A subject is discussed in certain terms. The
words used are the raw material for the thinking
about a certain subject and are thus interesting
for closer study. In doing so we should take the
so-called connotative meanings of words into
account, that which one non-literally expresses
with words, or with much used metaphors. A
person who talks about ‘the refugees problem’
immediately sets the discussion in a certain light.
Usually the idea is namely not the problem of the
refugees, but our problem with the refugees.
When farmers talk about ‘how green the trees are
around their intensive pig farms’ it can be
interpreted as a literal comment or as a metaphor
for their nature-friendliness. After all, from their
point of view they plant trees which flourish in
places which others see as a source of
environmental damage.
c. Labelling
And also the following must be considered.
Particular themes and a certain type of
terminology belong to specific social groups.
Every version of a subject is, so to speak,
labelled according to where it comes from. By
supporting or undermining a certain version we
express our alliance to a particular culture and
group. Whilst speaking we identify ourselves. We
confirm our own versions of the ‘we-group’
whilst at the same time distantiate ourselves from
the version of the ‘they-group’ which we ridicule
or consciously reject. These are two sides of the
same coin. With each ‘we-feeling’ there is also a
‘they-feeling’ (Turner, 1991: 28). This is an
active and dynamic process. It means that by
labelling we continuously ascertain that which
does and does not belong to us and either keep or
discard one version. 
Construction workers derive their identity partly
from the sturdy nature of the work they do.
Talking about the safety aspects of the job is not
their style. By making all labour regulations on
ergonomics and safety sound ridiculous they
verify their own identity and set up barriers
between themselves and the softies who view the
world from behind their desks.
What does all this mean for government
communication? There can be important
differences between the themes we find in policy
papers and official presentations and the themes a
subject is given in every day discourse. I know a
mayor who rejects his citizens feelings of lack of
safety by pointing to local statistics. Here a
formal opinion, based on officially reported
incidents clashes with an informal, ‘perceived’
version of the same phenomenon. The same
mayor wants his communication specialist to
challenge the latter version with arguments from
‘his’ version. It remains to be seen whether this
makes much difference and if it would not be
better to investigate the manner by which one
talks about this perceived lack of safety.
Furthermore, jargon can really obstruct effective
communication. For example, the communication
specialists on information-extension about
nutrition are almost glued to terms such as
‘carbohydrates’ and ‘polyunsaturated fatty
acids’! These are not words that come up often in
our everyday conversation about food. Which is
why these terms, like many other medical
concepts, are not suitable for making a change in
the way people (can) talk about food. And so it
possibly reduces the potential for developing a
different eating culture. Generally speaking, one
cannot explain social change without the
interaction between people. 
Labelling can be disastrous as well. Much
government communication is labelled after the
group that is seen as the instigator of a certain
policy. For example, it is possible that lorry
drivers would perceive the speed limit as an
initiative of environmental groups, who, having
no understanding of the economy, in their leisure
time, obstruct the hard working people. Thus a
‘we-group’ (realistic, industrious) and a ‘they-
group’ (utopian, taking it easy) are constructed.
If people talk in this manner and is worth
studying this, the willingness to act within the
law will be limited.
If you consider conversations as the motor for
social change you will be more readily prepared
to facilitate or stimulate such conversation.
Meetings form the core of every methodology in
interactive policy-making. To make such a
methodology effective it makes sense to
investigate how factual a discussion is in a
certain group at a certain time (see, for instance,
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Te Molder, 1995) and to see how this can be done
differently. The individual, static approach must
then be abandoned.
Views on democracy
Lastly, our view on policies and communication
is associated with how we think about
democracy. On this point Edwards distinguishes
three philosophical traditions: the collectivist, the
liberal and the republican (Edwards, 1994).
I follow his basis.
In the collectivist vision the central ideas are the
sovereignty of the people and their political
equality, the roots of which lie in the French
Revolution. What the state does should be a
reflection of what the people want. This works
(unfortunately, but inevitably) indirectly; the
paradigm of this model is, according to Edwards,
hierarchy, from the electorate, through the
parliament to the government. Politics has the
character of a collective will – and power
forming, with the citizens as carriers of ‘positive
freedom right’, through which they can shape
their lives and participate in politics.
In the liberal vision parties try to collect power.
When they have gained this through elections, it
gives them significant freedom to implement
their program. Among the parties there is
competition regarding the favours of the
electorate, as within the market, which is the
paradigm of this vision. The decision-making at
the top of the political tree is autonomous, but
restricted since voters can replace the ruling
authorities at regular intervals. Citizens have
‘negative freedom rights’, so that the state, or
other citizens, cannot break too far into this
private sphere. However, the controlled access to
the democratic process allows on the one hand
the state and on the other the parliament, to come
to feasible compromises through a process of
pushing and pulling, without too much
interference from voters.
The republican vision is process oriented.
Citizens talk amongst each other about what can
best be done regarding the public interest. The
paradigm is the conversation. The quality of
opinion-forming is most important, more so than
the ideal reflection, as in the collectivist vision,
or the choice for the best party on the market,
which offers what the citizen-client wants for his
or her individual needs. Citizens, therefore, have
to participate in public discussions. The ‘public
sphere’ is something that should be promoted
actively by the government and the results should
count in the political process.
In literature we find a renewed interest in the
republican vision. Van Gunsteren talks about
‘neo-republican citizenship’. His remark that the
citizen, in this vision, has a double role is of
interest: he is both the ruler and the ruled (Van
Gunsteren, 1994, p.46). We could say that every
citizen has a piece of government in his mind, a
faculty to recognise, to define and to think about
solutions with regard to problems that go beyond
the private territory. This is what citizens do in
their daily lives, in their many conversations, in
the sphere of the family but also among
strangers, in canteens, at parties, in sport clubs,
in pubs; people talk about public affairs and a
kind of democratic decision-making comes into
being. A government should promote these kinds
of conversations, among others by means of
creating ‘public spaces’; because, according to
Habermas: ‘the institutions of constitutional
freedom are only worth as much as a population
makes of them’ (Habermas, 1994, p.27).
At the moment, the collectivist tradition is under
debate because of the failing representative
democracy. The bond the politician has with his
grassroot supporters is highly problematic. It is
certainly not the case that ‘the will of the people’
is formed by the work of the political parties and
is passed on automatically through the political
representatives. The liberal tradition over-
emphasises the self-interested, financial-mind set
of the individual citizen, which, at the very least,
allows collectively irresponsible behaviour. The
‘calculating citizen’ is an outgrowth of this
development. The (neo-)republican vision offers
a perspective for a better quality of individual
opinion-forming and a more collective rational
outcome.
A republican vision can in part be positioned
opposite the instrumental approach that was
discussed earlier. ‘Planning of civil society is
today even less possible that it was in the past.
From the point of view of those steering it,
society becomes less and less recognisable’ (Van
Gunsteren, 1994, p.44). If a government cannot
manage society then it could possibly delegate or
give back part of its responsibility to the citizens,
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who through free interaction can perhaps come to
more effective and acceptable solutions.
The fact that many societal problems have a
value-loaded content plays a role here. For pure
technological problems a government, with the
help of science, can possibly construct an ideal
solution, against which not many objections are
possible, for example, protection against flood-
water. However, it is often not possible to tackle
problems from a technical-rational perspective
and there can only be an intersubjective
consensus formed about what should be done.
We can recognise this clearly with typical ethical
discussions, for instance, about abortion or
euthanasia, but also with issues such as the
application of biotechnology or the development
of certain kinds of plans for nature. How the
‘Green Heart’ of Holland should be planned
cannot be determined by science. Citizens should
talk about this together.
Yet we should not be so naïve as to think that the
outcome of this discussion will be unequivocal.
Dryzek talks about ‘consensus based on reasoned
disagreement, by striving to understand the
cultural tradition and/or conceptual framework of
the other partners. This disagreement would
ideally concern only different conceptions of the
public interest rather than competing private
interests the key to conflict resolution in
participatory democracy is the transformation of
private interests into publicly defensible values in
unrestricted debate’ (Dryzek, 1994, p.42).
In many situations in the past, groups of
organised citizens have put politicians under
pressure in order to arrange things of public
interest (the environment, nature, public health,
etcetera). In a favourable but positive public
climate this could then be converted into policies
and applied to groups of citizens who had not, or
hardly (often only through their representatives)
been involved in the whole policy process. It is
clear that a process like this, with the government
as the ‘key player’, causes little acceptance from
these same subjects. They literally feel victims of
the policies and moreover have to suffer because
of them, thanks to a lack of discussion, the
policies are badly suited to their actual needs.
Based on the republican vision, discussions
should be initiated between parties that ask for a
policy and those that can bear responsibility for
problem solution. Thus, a sense of dependency
can be built up in the first instance. An example
of this is to be found in agriculture. Farmers
cannot work properly in conditions where their
activities are constantly under fire: for the
environment, animal welfare, nature, etcetera. A
‘social contract’ should be made, to allow for an
acceptable and viable agriculture. This
dependency of others is felt increasingly strongly
by farmers. In return, environmental groups learn
from their contact with farmers about what it is
like to be farming nowadays. Respect for each
other’s motives and a certain care for each other’s
objectives comes into being. This way solutions
can be initiated that satisfy broad groups and
have more potential for change than regulations
via a compelling government.
What does this mean for a CS? He or she will
have to try to create a public sphere that enables
similar discussions. ‘The modern public sphere
seemingly recalls the representative publicness of
the middle ages, where elites displayed
themselves to the masses while at the same time
using the forum to communicate amongst
themselves’ according to Dahlgren and Sparks
(Dahlgren & Sparks, 1991, p.10). Perhaps this
observation is not entirely correct. Outside the
circle of the privileged there is (informal)
discussion as well, as I stated earlier. But there is
a wide gap between the official platform and the
thousands of country-wide discussions. As a
policy-maker, the citizen is not really taken
seriously while he is, certainly with regard to
value-loaded decisions, a very relevant partner.
Also, concerning the more sophisticated analysis
of problems and solutions, he often has ideas that
policies lack. The arguments that are developed
on the official platform often have little meaning
outside of it (Wagemans, 1990).
How does a CS do this? How is a ‘citizen made
from a civilian’, active and involved. This is
partly a methodological question, interactive
situations have to be shaped. One of the most
intriguing possibilities seems to be the Internet,
which is like a village square or, if you like, an
18th century Parisian salon with Internet time
and location problems that surround participation
are overcome. With it, the CS is the moderator
who organises, stimulates and guides similar
discussions and who makes connections with
policies, either by involving policy-makers
directly in the discussion or by intensive
reporting of the results of the discussion.
However, more can be achieved through classical
The Journal of Agricultural Education and Extension, 2000, vol. 6, no. 4
210
means, from major public debates to sitting-room
meetings.
Another part of the function of the CS will be the
promotion of a specific kind of communicative
thinking within his or her own organisation. This
trend, which is directed at the output of
information has to be restructured towards
interaction among (groups of) citizens
themselves and between them and the policies. In
fact, for every policy that has to be made one
should think about how citizens will be involved
in it. ‘The task of reproducing citizens is implied
in every governmental action. Every
governmental action can and may be examined in
terms of its effect on (the reproduction of)
citizenship, just as we now judge nearly all
governmental action in terms of its effect on the
financial deficit’ (Van Gunsteren, 1994, p. 46).
Conclusion
We have seen how five theoretical approaches
symbolise the turn-around in the thinking about
communication and policies. They are closely
related, but each one in itself represents a certain
perspective on the issue, with a specific
literature. Together they form the basis for a very
different communication strategy.
The main idea behind this strategy is to free
people (e.g. farmers) from their coping behaviour
with existing policy plans made for them, and to
give them a place in the process of making such
plans (whether or not official, governmental
plans). The function of this active involvement is,
firstly, to make better, more effective plans and
secondly, to enhance learning processes by which
people understand problems and solutions, how
and why they think about these, and also how and
why other people think about these, (social
learning processes) by which people understand
problems and solutions, as a base for a
constructive societal dialogue.
Especially in the adaptation of agriculture to
new requirements (on the environment, animal
welfare, food security, nature, the cultural value
of landscapes, etcetera) this new approach is
desirable and needed. Many farmers still
defensively try to undermine claims from the
outside world, instead of being active in the
construction of sustainable relationships with the
society in which they live. Others make the best
of it, by accepting criticism from other groups as
a social fact, stupid but unavoidable, and by
negotiating fiercely on every inch to get what
they can get. Fortunately, there is a growing
group of farmers who take the initiative for
another style of bargaining, with respect for the
ideas of others and a willingness to deal with
their motives and backgrounds. For these farmers
this new approach can create fresh possibilities.
Van Woerkum
References
Bekkers, V. (1994). Nieuwe vormen van sturing en  informatisering: over het ambivalente karakter van
transparantie, in: A.Zuurmond e.a. Informatisering in het openbaar bestuur.  ‘s-Gravenhage, Vuga, 161-176.
Crigler, A.N. and K.B. Jensen (1991). Discourses on politics: Talking about public issues in the United States
and Denmark. In: P. Dahlgren and C. Sparks (Eds.). Communication and citizenship. Londen, Routledge.
Dahlgren, P. and C.Sparks (Red.), (1991). Communication and citizenship. Londen, Routledge
Dryzek, J.S. (1994). Discursive democracy; politics, policy, and political science. Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press..
Edwards, P. (1994). Informatisering, democratie en de staatsburgerrol, in: A.Zuurmond e.a. Informatisering in
het openbaar bestuur. ‘s-Gravenhage, Vuga, 309-318.
Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Habermas, J. (1994). Citizenship and national identity, in: B.van Steenbergen (Red.). The condition of
citizenship. Londen, Sage, 20-35.
Hewstone, M., W. Stroebe, J.P. Codol and G.M. Stephenson (1988). Introduction to social psychology. Oxford,
Basic Blackwell.
Katz, E. and P.E.Lazarsfeld (1995). Personal influence. New York, The Free Press.
Leeuwis, C. (1993). On computers, myths and modelling. Wageningen, Landbouwuniversiteit, Wageningse
Sociologische Studies, nr. 36 (dissertatie)
211
McQuail, D. (1994). Mass Communication Theory, London, Sage.
Meegeren, R.C.F.van (1995). Milieuvoorlichting. Meppel, Boom.
Molder, H. te (1995). Discourse of dilemma’s. Wageningen, vakgroep Voorlichtingskunde,
Landbouwuniversiteit, PhD dissertation.
O’Keefe, D.J. (1990). Persuasion: theory and research. Newbury Park, Sage.
Potter, J. and M.Wetherell (1987). Discourse and social psychology; beyond attitudes and behaviour. London:
Sage.
Rogers, E.M. and D.L.Kincaid (1981). Communication networks. New York, The Free Press.
Turner, J.C. (1991). Social influence. Buckingham, Open Univerity.
Van Gunsteren, H. R. (1994). Four conceptions of citizenship. In: B.van Steenbergen (Red.). The condition of
citizenship. Londen, Sage, 36-48.
Van Woerkum, C.M.J.(1989). Massamediale voorlichting; een werkplan. Boom, Meppel.
Van Woerkum, C.M.J. (1995). Over bewuste en onbewuste communicatie. In: E.Hollander, C.van der Linden en
P.Rutten  (Red.) Communication, culture, community. Liber amicorum James Stappers. Houten, Bohn
Stafleu Van Loghum. 75-81.
Van Woerkum, C.M.J., M.N.C. Aarts and C. Leeuwis (1999). Communication strategies, tourism and the natural
environment. In: H. Briassoulis and J. Van der Straaten (Eds.). Tourism and the environment; regional,
economic, cultural and policy issues. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 239-254.
Van Woerkum, C.M.J., M.N.C. Aarts and M. Van der Poel (1999). Communication in Policy Processes.
European Spatial Research and Policy, 6(1), 75-86.
Wagemans, M.C.H. (1990). The role of information in planning: the case of  town and country planning.
Knowledge in society, 3, 4, 72-90.
Weenig, M.H.W. and C.J.H.Midden (1991). Communication networks influences on information, diffusion and
persuasion. Journal of personality and social psychology, 61,  734-742.
Wilke, H.A.M. (1991). Gedrag en cognitie. In: N.K.de Vries en J.van der Pligt (Red.). Cognitieve sociale
psychologie. Meppel, Boom, 435-456.
Wilke, H.A.M. (1992). Ironie des Staates. Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp Verlag.
The Journal of Agricultural Education and Extension, 2000, vol. 6, no. 4
212
